The aim of this essay is to situate the travelogue of Pak Chiwȏn in the context of the new Qing history and the recent interest in Chengde studies. Most studies of Pak Chiwȏn situate him in the Korean tradition of yȏnhaeng 燕行-literally, "journey to Beijing." This essay begins by noting, quite simply, that the specific achievement and significance of Yȏrha ilgi needs to be framed in terms of its necessary departure from the generic expectations and constraints of yȏnhaengnok. Pak intended to go to Beijing, and he did, but Beijing turned out to be a stopover rather than the end destination; unexpectedly, and dramatically, he ended up in Chengde or Yȏ rha 熱河. It would therefore seem logical to query in what ways his travelogue diverges from, rather than conforms to, the yȏnhaengnok tradition. In Chengde, Pak met not only Manchus and Han Chinese, but also Mongols, Uyghur Muslims, and Tibetans. Confronted with this great ethnic and cultural mix in a city never before traveled to by a Chosȏn embassy, Pak resorts, on the one hand, to the traditional language of the "barbarian," a hierarchical language of ethnic difference. On the other hand, he also shows a sensitive awareness of the transactional and relative nature of ethnicity. By closely examining the different terms-ho 胡, ro 虜, chȏk 狄, orangk'ae 兀良哈, and combinations thereof, such as horo 胡虜 and hojȏk 胡狄-Pak used to describe the unfamiliar peoples he met in Chengde, this essay analyzes his reading of the difference and variety at the heart of the Qing empire.
Introduction: Yȏrha ilgi and the New Qing History
The aim of this paper is to situate the travelogue of Pak Chiwȏ n in the context of the new Qing history and the recent interest in Chengde studies. Most studies of Pak Chiwȏ n situate him in the Korean tradition of yȏ nhaeng 燕行-literally, "journey to Beijing." 1 Pak's Yȏ rha ilgi is considered one of the three finest examples of late-Chosȏ n yȏ nhaengnok 燕行錄-variously translated as "record of a journey to Beijing" or "Peking diary genre." Within Korean studies, there has traditionally been very little disagreement as to which constitute the finest three. Besides Pak's Yȏ rha ilgi, Kim Ch'angȏ p's Kajae yȏ nhaengnok (or Nogajae yȏ nhaeng ilgi) and Hong Taeyong's Tamhȏ n yȏ ngi have long been considered the finest examples of the genre.
2 This essay begins by noting, quite simply, that the specific achievement of Yȏ rha ilgi needs to be framed in terms of its necessary departure from the generic expectations and constraints of yȏ nhaengnok. Pak intended to go to Beijing, and he did, but Beijing turned out to be a stopover rather than the end destination. Unexpectedly, and dramatically, he ended up in Yȏ rha 熱河. Of all eighteenth-and nineteenth-century Chosȏ n diarists, he was the first to travel there. 3 It would therefore seem logical to query in what ways his travelogue diverges from, rather than conforms to, the yȏ nhaengnok tradition. What did he see in Yȏ rha? Whom did he meet? Did his experience in Yȏ rha change his understanding of the Qing empire?
Yȏ rha is the Korean name for an area of northeast China conventionally referred to as Rehe 熱河 (or Jehol in western records) and today corresponding to 1. The term yȏnhaeng is specific to the Qing period, as it refers to Chosȏn embassies that traveled to the Qing capital of Beijing to pay tribute. The earlier Ming term was choch'ȏn or "going to the Heavenly kingdom." Yȏnhaeng is obviously a much more neutral term and reflects Chosȏn discomfort with the Manchu rulers of the Qing empire. See Jung Jae-Hoon [Chȏng Chaehun], "Meeting the World through Eighteenth-Century Yȏnhaeng," Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 23, no. 1 (2010), 54.
northern Hebei province. 4 The Kangxi emperor, who began visiting the region in 1681 to hunt on lands belonging to the Kharachin, Aukhan, and Ongni'ud Mongols, formalized his control of the area by establishing an imperial hunting preserve there and holding yearly hunting parties with his Mongol allies. As the institution of the imperial hunt grew both in size and significance, Kangxi found himself in need of a proper residence. In 1703 he started building an elaborate summer palace, the Bishu shanzhuang 避暑山莊 (Mountain Villa to Escape the Heat), in the city of Chengde.
5 Located approximately 250 kilometers northeast of Beijing, halfway between the capital and Mulan, the hunting grounds of the Manchus, Chengde effectively became the summer capital of the Qing emperors, a central locus from which they would orchestrate the complex ritual maneuvers designed at reaffirming the Qing ties with the nomadic, "steppe culture" of the north. 6 In Mapping Chengde: The Qing Landscape Enterprise, an important monograph on the architectural and cultural meanings of Chengde as an imperial landscape, Philippe Forêt notes that the choice of Chengde as a summer capital would have been highly unlikely from a traditional Chinese point of view but made excellent strategic sense for the Manchu emperors. Located well beyond the Great Wall, in a frontier area where much geopolitical strife had taken place, Chengde symbolized the extension of the Qing dynasty far beyond the Ming borders as well as the incorporation of northern lands long considered inimical and barbarian in the Chinese imaginary. Chengde meant nothing less 4 . The historical use of the names Rehe and Chengde is very complex. Rehe refers to the "warm river" that feeds the city's lakes and generally applies to the larger geographical area; Chengde means "bearer of virtue" and is usually used to denote the city. However, these names were often switched. Philippe Forêt notes that the Kangxi emperor's name for Chengde was originally Rehe; the Yongzheng emperor changed the city's name to Chengde; the Qianlong emperor changed it to Rehe in 1742, then changed it back again to Chengde in 1778 when he ordered the construction of the Confucian Wen miao Temple. See Forêt, Mapping Chengde: The Qing Landscape Enterprise (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000), 16. Western writings from the eighteenth century refer both to the general area and the city as Rehe (or Jehol in French and German writings), after the river. See Ruth W. Dunnell and James A. Millward's introduction to New Qing Imperial History, ed. James A. Millward, Ruth W. Dunnell, Mark C. Elliott, and Philippe Forêt (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 1-2. In this paper I focus on the city of Chengde and the imperial palace complex. than "the effective extension of the Chinese cultural landscape north of the Great Wall for the first time in twenty centuries." 7 In constructing a capital on the margins of the Chinese imaginary, the Qing emperors were very deliberately violating previous political, aesthetic, and cultural precedents set by the Han, Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties. Unlike Liaoyang, Shenyang (Mukden), and Beijing, the other cities that were inherited from the Ming dynasty, Chengde was an entirely Qing capital, a "created landscape" where the Qing could map out "a system of symbolic landmarks" that could express the unique achievements and geopolitical ambitions of the new multi-ethnic, multi-cultural empire.
8
Ruth W. Dunnell and James A. Millward have also pointed to Chengde's importance as "a practical and symbolic command center from which the Manchu rulers coordinated relations between China, an expanding Russian empire, and Inner Asia."
9 Noting that "a wide-ranging revision of the history of the Manchu empire in China and inner Asia" has recently occurred among historians of China, Dunnell and Millward view Chengde as a critical focal point in what is often referred to as the "new Qing history." By making an "ethnic turn in China studies," the new Qing history has moved away from traditional, sinocentric Chinese historiography and emphasized the ethnic and cultural diversity of the Qing empire, opening up new ways of conceptualizing Chinese foreign relations. 10 The new Qing history decenters the standard binary opposition between the Chinese and the "barbarians" and asks: How did the Qing dynasty manage the feat of building an empire that simultaneously incorporated the Han Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Uyghurs, and Tibetans? How did the ruling Manchus conceptualize their relationship to the various other non-Han peoples who made up an essential part of the new empire? How did the Manchus manage relations with these non-Han peoples long considered barbarians in sinocentric ideology?
By analyze, in particular, Pak's negotiation of ethnic categories and cultural difference in his descriptions of the various peoples he met in Chengde. The term "ethnic" is here used advisedly. As Pamela Kyle Crossley has pointed out, the words "ethnicity" and "ethnic" are drawn from the Greek etymon ethnos that refers to an idea of outsidership-"peoples living outside the 'civilized' urban centers" were the original ethnics. In origin, then, "Ethnos is self-consciously a formation from cultural centrality and eliteness, and frequently labels the marginal, the uncivilized, the unassimilated, the common;" it is an idea of the "local, particular, minor, heterodox, marginal" that was applied most frequently to "border and aboriginal populations, all at cultural or philosophical odds with the orthodox, central establishment." 11 As such, the original meaning of "ethnic" preserves its essentially political intention to exclude and alienate groups deemed threatening to the central establishment. As Crossley puts it, the concept originally "captured the elements of taxonomy, isolation and subordination to which many peoples are subjected in imperial systems."
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Pak can be said to mobilize the political concept of ethnicity in this original sense insofar as he is preoccupied with notions of the border and frontier; with peoples living in heterodoxy outside and beyond Confucian culture; with groups whose relationship to Chungguk (Zhongguo 中國), or the Middle Kingdom, was in constant flux. This notion of ethnicity should not be confounded with the modern concept of racial or biological difference which, as Crossley points out, confuses cause with effect. Whereas "the historical importance of ethnicity is found primarily in its cultural, social and political impact"-in other words, in the political processes it sets in motion-the objectifying concept of racial difference transmutes such political effects into biological causes.
13
As I hope to show, in Yȏ rha ilgi Pak struggles with ethnic taxonomy, often 11. Pamela Kyle Crossley, "Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China," Late Imperial China 11, no. 1 (1990): 12-13.
12. Ibid., 13.
13. Ibid., 24. Crossley, who writes, "It is not self-evident that 'ethnicity' is an appropriate or exceptionally fruitful concept for the analysis of Chinese late imperial social history," notes "the irreconcilable incompatibility between sinological concepts (including 'sinicization') and contemporary ethnic studies" on the basis of this conceptual confusion between ethnicity as cause and ethnicity as effect. For this reason, she advocates "diachronic studies" of the concept of ethnicity that query, rather than assume, its validity as a tool of social and historical analysis. See Crossley, "Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China," 1-2. using ethnic vocabulary in a highly skeptical and playful way. On the one hand, with the exception of the Manchus, Pak is loath to acknowledge the various "ethnic" populations he meets in Chengde as an integral part of the Qing imperial polity. On the other hand, Pak also shows a sensitive awareness of the transactional and relative nature of ethnicity. To the extent that ethnos implicates a hierarchical opposition between the civilized and the heathen, we could say ethnicity mobilizes a concept of the barbarian as someone who is not civilized, "not part of the canon, not part of the established culture central to the legitimacy of the state, not mainstream, not authoritative."
14 It is in this very specific sense that the word "barbarian" is used in this paper. By focusing on the diverse names Pak used to describe the ethnic and cultural others who defined the space of Chengde, this essay will analyze the ways in which Pak mobilizes the concept of the barbarian "other" throughout the Yȏ rha ilgi. As we shall see, however, the term had a way of redounding upon himself. My claim throughout this essay is not that Pak was invested in ethnic taxonomy as such, or that he had a coherent concept of ethnicity. Rather, it is that his experience in Chengde forced him continually to rethink and revaluate the concepts of political center and periphery as they pertained to the Qing empire, and that in this process he resorted to ethnic names in a highly self-conscious and self-reflexive manner. This essay does not purport to be an exhaustive study on the subject. Its aim is first and foremost to identify a line of inquiry that has hitherto been neglected in studies on the Yȏ rha ilgi and to open up a space for fruitful discussion.
Meeting the Panchen Lama
During the Ming dynasty, Chosȏ n sent three regular official tributary embassies per year to the Chinese court: one at the beginning of the lunar year (chȏ ngjosa 正朝使), one on the occasion of the emperor's birthday (sȏ ngjȏ lsa 聖節使), and a third on the birthday of the heir apparent (taeja ch'ȏ nch'usa 太子千秋使). Later, a winter solstice embassy (tongjisa 冬至使) came to substitute for the lunar year embassy. 15 In addition to these regular embassies, the Chosȏ n court sent additional embassies to deliver specific memorials, gifts, or messages of thanks or condolence. 16 In 1637, when Hong Taiji defeated the Chosȏ n forces led by King Injo, he initially demanded regular Chosȏ n embassies for five annual events in addition to the annual tribute mission (yȏ n'gong 年貢): the emperor's birthday (sȏ ngjȏ l 聖節), the empress's birthday (chunggung ch'ȏ nch'u 中宮千秋), the birthday of the heir apparent (taeja ch'ȏ nch'u 太子千秋), the beginning of the lunar year (chȏ ngjo 正朝), and the winter solstice (tongji 冬至). In actuality, however, no embassies were sent for the birthdays of the empress or the heir apparent. In 1645, one year after the Qing moved the capital to Beijing, the Chosȏ n court was told to combine all the above tributary embassies into one and to send a combined embassy at the occasion of the beginning of the lunar year.
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Pak Chiwȏ n 朴趾源 (1737-1783) traveled to Beijing in 1780 as an unofficial member of a Choso˘n embassy to the Qing court. His third-cousin Pak Myȏ ngwȏ n 朴明源 had been appointed chȏ ngsa 正使, or envoy, and Pak Chiwȏ n managed to tag along as a family-member of his cousin. The other two main officials were Chȏ ng Wȏ nsi 鄭元始, the pusa 副使 or associate envoy, and Cho Chȏ ngjin 趙鼎鎭, the sȏ janggwan 書狀官 or attendant secretary. 18 This was a highly unusual mission because Pak Myȏ ngwȏ n's embassy was dispatched solely to give thanks to the Qianlong emperor and to commemorate his seventy-sui birthday. As noted above, between the years 1646 and 1780 there had been no independent birthday missions from the Chosȏ n court to Beijing. When Pak Myȏ ngwȏ n's embassy departed, he was well aware that Qianlong would not be 16 18. The chȏngsa was the chief envoy and responsible for representing the embassy; he also represented the Chosȏn state in the performance of rites; the pusa or associate envoy usually had expertise in China matters; the sȏjanggwan or attendant secretary submitted a report to the Royal Secretariat (Sȗ ngjȏ ngwȏ n) upon return. See Jung Jae-Hoon, "Meeting the World through Eighteenth-Century Yȏnhaeng," 54-55. I use Hae-Jong Chun's English translations of these titles. Chun notes that the envoy and the associate envoy were nominated from among the princes and officials of rank higher than 3A, and the attendant secretary from among those higher than 6B. Most of the other embassy members were recommended from among the Sayȏkwȏn or the Office of Interpreters. It was common for embassy members to be accompanied by various retainers and companions who were mostly chosen by the members themselves. See Chun, "Sino-Korean Tributary Relations in the Ch'ing Period," 93-95. in Beijing to celebrate his birthday (thirteenth day of the eighth lunar month) but would be in Chengde, where he usually spent the summer (late June through late September according to the Gregorian calendar). The Chosȏ n emissaries assumed that they would be honoring his birthday by attending the ritual celebrations in Beijing in his absence. They arrived in Beijing on the first day of the eighth month after more than two months on the road, battered and exhausted by the journey. When they learned on the fourth day of that month that Qianlong desired their presence in Chengde, they were therefore shocked rather than elated. It was a singular honor to be invited to Chengde, but they had no way of fathoming Qianlong's reasons for inviting them. Indeed, no Chosȏ n mission had ever traveled to Chengde. On the fifth day a much smaller party composed of the central members of the embassy departed for Chengde with heavy hearts. They faced tremendous pressure to arrive in Chengde in time for the lengthy ritual celebrations. In Pak's words, they rode on their horses day and night, through rain and swollen summer rivers. Pak writes that they traveled "like blind men, or as in a dream."
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In retrospect, it is quite clear that Qianlong's unprecedented decision to summon a Chosȏ n embassy to Chengde had very little to do with the embassy proper, and everything to do with another grand event that he had orchestrated in the northern capital for his seventy-sui birthday in 1780: namely, the visit of the Third Panchen Lama (1737-1780). As mentioned above, Chengde was the privileged site for the imperial hunt, a distinctly Qing ritual that, unlike the Beijing "pilgrimage" (chaojin 朝覲; nianban 年班) or "tribute" (chaogong 朝貢) rituals, did not take place in the winter in Beijing but rather in the summer grasslands of the Mongolian steppe.
20 Like Chosȏ n, Tibet usually sent tribute in the twelfth month of the lunar calendar, with the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama sending separate tribute missions every other year. On the occasion of Qianlong's seventy-sui birthday, however, the Panchen Lama had at long last decided to attend the imperial birthday celebration. This was, from Qianlong's point of view, a dramatic diplomatic coup. The Chosȏ n envoys would eventually learn, to their utter dismay, that Qianlong's ulterior motive in summoning them to Chengde had to do with honoring the Panchen Lama's visit. 
See Elisabeth Benard's "The Qianlong Emperor and Tibetan Buddhism" (New Qing Imperial
Pak Chiwȏ n had his own personal reasons for not wishing to go to Chengde. He writes:
I sincerely desired to travel on with them, but could not bear the idea of again embarking on a long journey when I had barely had time to step down from the saddle and rest. The second reason I was reluctant to join the mission was that, if the Emperor should command that we return to Chosȏ n directly, all my hopes of seeing Beijing would come to nothing.
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The chance to see Beijing was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. Would he be able to return to Beijing after visiting Chengde? Clearly, Chengde did not hold the same cultural interest for Pak. It took nothing less than the words of the chȏ ngsa himself to change Pak's mind. Pak Myȏ ngwȏ n's argument was that, whereas Beijing was a place that countless Chosȏ n visitors had already seen, no Korean had yet seen Yȏ rha. It was a miracle that they had been given the chance to go there. Surely it was a "once-in-a-thousand-years opportunity."
23 Besides, what was Pak going to say to the people back home who, upon the return of the embassy, were sure to ask him what he had seen in Yȏ rha? How could Pak not go under these circumstances? In the end, Pak appears to have been won over by his cousin's argument, but there are numerous clues to the inner torment he felt upon leaving Beijing without being able to visit its sights properly. The long excursus on the sadness of bidding farewell that immediately follows the account of his conversation with his cousin, and the numerous descriptions of the physical hazards he encountered during the journey to Yȏ rha are clues to Pak's uncertainty about his "once-in-a thousand-years" luck.
There was another problem. Without an official title or mission, Pak did not have the right to attend the most important rituals at Chengde. In other words, he had only limited authority to explore the most prized sights of Chengde. In Beijing, he would have been perfectly content to be exempt from the rituals and to find himself at liberty to explore the city. In Chengde, however, he was at a loss. The Chosȏ n travelers arrived in Chengde on the ninth day of the eighth month, and the three main officials began their duties on the tenth, rising before dawn to present themselves at the Bishu shanzhuang. Pak did manage to follow the chȏ ngsa into the waiting quarters of the Bishu shanzhuang on the tenth and the eleventh. Here he witnessed the first exchanges between Pak Myȏ ngwȏ n and Deboo 德保, the Manchu minister of the Board of Rites, and enjoyed the privilege of eating three breakfast dishes sent by the Emperor. But that was as far as he could go; he could not go beyond the waiting quarters. Between the twelfth and the fourteenth, he consoled himself with the sweetness of sleeping in while the others fulfilled their duties at the Bishu shanzhuang. Upon rising, Pak was reduced to joining the throngs of spectators around the palace walls and looking through keyholes, or perching on a stool and standing on his toes in an effort to catch a glimpse of the performances at court. In the diary entries for the twelfth day of the eighth month, Pak describes himself comically as an unsuccessful bystander at a historical event. Standing on his toes while peering through the crowds, he reports, he often lost his balance and teetered like a "fat water-fowl on a stick." The banquet was so close and yet so beyond reach, he says, that it was "like dreaming of a feast; I ate but I could not taste."
24
What we have in Yȏ rha ilgi, then, is very far from an authoritative account of Chengde seen from the perspective of an official on a state mission. Instead, we have a series of often humorous, random side scenes: Pak strolling aimlessly through the streets of Chengde, visiting fruit stalls and walking into a tavern full of Mongols and Uyghurs; ogling the emperor's gifts presented to the Chosȏ n officials; whiling away the hours by brush-talking with various people he met during his stay; watching the herds of horses, cows, donkeys and sheep being led out of their stalls to their daily pastures while the imperial banquets are taking place. Pak's self-description in these scenes is ironical and self-deprecating. Pak was well aware, however, that as a non-official member of the embassy he also possessed an advantage; he was at greater liberty to pursue his cultural curiosity and to act without being paralyzed by diplomatic protocol.
Soon after their arrival in Chengde, the Chosȏ n visitors found themselves in a quandary. The very day after their arrival, Pak claims, they received a message from Qianlong requesting that they pay a visit to the Panchen Lama. Whereas the envoys reacted to the imperial message with horror and consternation, Pak was able to see their political dilemma as "a very interesting problem." Schooled in strict neo-Confucianism, the Chosȏ n emissaries knew that they would face disastrous political consequences back home if they were to pay obeisance to a "living Buddha." 26 On the other hand, they were hardly in a position to raise objections to the Qing emperor. Pak says he could only foresee one possible outcome. In the end, the Chosȏ n emissaries would need to defend their political integrity and go against the imperial command; Qianlong would be forced to punish their disobedience by sending them away into exile. Pak says he was so excited by the "extravagant and romantic" prospect of following the disgraced emissaries into such unexplored, remote regions as Vietnam (Kyoju 交州) or Canton that he immediately started drinking to celebrate his good luck. 27 Pak's stance here is of course deliberately and ironically facetious. He could not have responded with such alacrity if his prediction had come true. In the end, Pak writes, the emissaries decided to follow Qianlong's directions, but they took up so much time debating what course of action they should take that they ended up starting out too late in the day. Halfway to the Panchen Lama's residence at Tashilhunpo, they were met by a messenger from the emperor who told them to turn back and to pay their respects to the Panchen Lama another day. 28 Pak claims that this exchange generated another round of painful anxiety for the Chosȏ n envoys who were having difficulty fathoming precisely what the emperor's intentions were.
The actual visit took place the next day, on the eleventh. Pak almost missed the show. After following his cousin to the Bishu shanzhuang before dawn, he took off alone and had a small adventure in a local tavern full of Mongols and Uyghurs. By the time he arrived at the Bishu shanzhuang after being informed that the Chosȏ n emissaries were leaving for Tashilhunpo, they were already gone. Pak paints a comic picture of his desperate efforts to catch up with the emissaries: he evidently took off on his horse in such haste that he forgot to ask for detailed instructions; he made such a spectacle of being lost that the soldiers pointed him northwest to the temple district. When he finally caught up with his fellow countrymen, they teased him for being too much of a tourist for his own 26. Ibid., 12.79a.
27. Ibid., 12.78b.
28. Known as Sumeru Temple today, Xumi fushou miao, or the Temple of the Happiness and Longevity of Mt. Sumeru was constructed in 1780 specifically to accommodate the Panchen Lama. Built in imitation of the Panchen Lama's residence at Tashilhunpo (Bkra shis lhun po) in Shigatse, it was the last of the twelve Buddhist temples to be built just beyond the stone walls surrounding the Bishu shanzhuang. See Dunnell and Millward's introduction to New Qing Imperial History, 6-8 for a succinct description of the Chengde temple complex. Pak refers to the Xumi fushou miao as Tashilhunpo.
good. According to Pak's ensuing account, the encounter between the Chosȏ n visitors and the Panchen Lama was not a success. The Chosȏ n envoys had quarreled in the morning with the Manchu minister of the Board of Rites, who insisted that they kowtow before the Panchen Lama. When the envoys met the Panchen Lama, they were again instructed to kowtow, but they fumbled their bodily gestures and pretended to be unaware that they were supposed to do so. In Pak's words, the three Chosȏ n officials acquiesced to Tibetan tradition and presented khata (ceremonial scarves made of white silk) to the Panchen Lama but without bowing their heads, then retreated, hastily sitting down on black velvet cushions before anybody could force them to kowtow. This account, as Pak acknowledges, does not agree with the records of the Board of Rites in which the Chosȏ n emissaries are said to have followed the Board's directions and completed the ceremony fully in accordance with protocol. Pak devotes many pages of the Yȏ rha ilgi to "correcting" the official Qing record in order to defend his cousin who became embroiled in a controversy over ritual correctness once he returned home. 29 As reported by Pak, this episode shows the degree to which the Qing dynasty's cultural and religious heterogeneity and heterodoxy posed philosophical and political difficulties for the Chosȏ n intellectuals who continued to identify Chinese legitimacy with Confucian rituals, learning, and culture. It was a great shock for members of Pak Myȏ ngwȏ n's embassy to meet the Panchen Lama and to witness first-hand the Qianlong emperor's ceremonial practice of Tibetan Buddhism. Pak devotes entire sections of Yȏ rha ilgi, in particular "Hwanggyo mundap" 黃敎問答, "Panso˘n simal" 班禪始末, and "Tashilhunpo" 札十倫布, to investigate both the religious and political nature of Qianlong's investment in Tibetan Buddhism. Seeing the Qing court in Chengde was very different from seeing it in Beijing. In Chengde, where the Qing court staged elaborate events "to impress Inner Asian visitors, confirm the loyalty of Mongol and Turkic nobles, and show respect to Tibetan lamas," the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural composition of the Qing dynasty was brought to the fore. Inner Asian, as well as a Chinese, empire," to borrow Dunnell and Millward's phrase.
The traditional terms used to differentiate and discriminate between those who belonged to the Middle Kingdom 中國 and those who did not were hwa 華 and yi 夷.
31 As is well known, the conquest of the Ming dynasty by the Manchus created a grave conceptual difficulty for sinocentric Chosȏ n thinkers who were used to identifying the Middle Kingdom with the Han Chinese. The Manchus, according to the sinocentric scheme, were classified as yi or barbarian. The character yi was originally used to refer to the non-Han people of the east and was usually used in conjunction with the character dong 東, as in the term dongyi 東夷 or "eastern barbarians." The correspondent characters for the barbarians of the west was rong 戎 (yung in Korean pronunciation), while the barbarians or the north were called di 狄 (K. chȏ k) and the southern barbarians were called man 蠻. Gradually the character yi became a metonym for all the peoples of the peripheries and was used in this universalist, discriminatory sense to designate all those who were excluded from the civilized bounds of the Middle Kingdom. 32 According to this traditional scheme, both Chosȏ n and the Manchus were yi and barbarian. For this reason, there were efforts made during the Qing dynasty to divest the term yi of its barbarian connotations.
The Yongzheng emperor, for instance, drew on the authority of the Mencius to delimit the meaning of yi in his treatise Dayi juemi lu 大義覺密綠 (Awakening to supreme justice, 1730).
[King] Shun was born in Zhufeng, moved to Fuxia, and died in Mingtiao. He was a man of the eastern yi. King Wen was born in Qizhou and died in Biying. He was a man of the western yi. Those regions were distant from one another by more than a thousand li and the age of the one sage was posterior to that of the other by more than a thousand years. But when they got their wish, and carried their principles into practice throughout the Central States, it was like uniting the two halves of a seal. When we examine those sages, both the earlier and the later, their principles are found to be the same. 33 If the most ancient sages were of the eastern and western yi, this meant that geographical origin could pose no obstacle to philosophical and political legitimacy. The Chosȏ n intellectuals regarded themselves as peripheral only in this strictly geographical sense of being located in the eastern yi. Like the Manchus, they found ways of "limiting the semantic scope of the concept of yi" and "taming" it, robbing it of its "subversive potential."
The Manchus argued that the concept of yi was consistent with their notion of political sovereignty because it was fully included within their expansive vision of empire. They were careful, in other words, to disentangle their vision of sovereignty from ideas of race or ethnicity. "Instead, the legitimacy of that regime and its subordination of the Han population were said to rest on the classical concept of de or virtue that the Manchus took from the Confucian rituals."
34 For many Chosȏ n intellectuals, however, the Manchu appropriation of de 德 was an affront to Confucianism, which they believed had been better preserved in Chosȏ n than in China. This was why they referred to their nation as Chunghwa 中華, turning the hwa-yi distinction inside out. They argued that their preservation of Confucian doctrine justified their claim to being the real hwa in an age when the Great Ming had fallen. This argument was possible because the Chosȏ n dynasty regarded the Qing court as yi, and much farther removed from true hwa identity than itself. Chosȏ n intellectuals thus became embroiled in complex doctrinal debates about how precisely how their own yi status was different from that of the Qing dynasty and what precisely constituted chunghwa. 35 since it could be appropriated by the yi. This instability of the hwa-yi distinction is also in marked evidence throughout Yȏ rha ilgi. Pak, who was one of the most outstanding spokesmen for the reformist pukhak 北學, or Northern Studies, movement, was openly admiring of the material wealth and technological advances of the Qing dynasty and took a practical stance toward Chosȏ n-Qing relations. As Gari Ledyard notes, Yȏ rha ilgi combined "foreign travel and description with a domestic political reform program." 36 Nonetheless, Pak was not free from the politics of sinocentrism; he too struggled with the question of whether or not the Qing dynasty could be regarded as a legitimate successor to Chinese civilization. This is why it was important for Pak to narrate the Chosȏ n envoys' resistance, however awkward and ambiguous, to the Tibetan rituals. Pak Myȏ ngwȏ n's embassy risked being written into practices interpreted as clearly anti-Confucian and, to that extent, illegitimate and "barbarian." Pak Chiwȏ n is clearly aware of the ideological and political stakes here. What makes his travelogue so interesting, however, is the way in which his official, ideological project of demarcating the barbarians' otherness in order to shore up his cousin's political legitimacy is subtly compromised by his self-reflexive sense of Chosȏ n identity itself being made barbarian, odd, peripheral, even comical in the eyes of the other barbarians he meets in Chengde.
Pak's terms for the various ethnic peoples he met in Chengde range from ho 胡, ro 虜, chȏ k 狄, and orangk'ae 兀良哈, to combinations thereof, such as horo 胡虜 and hojȏ k 胡狄. 37 These are terms that combine geographical, ethnic, and cultural meanings in deeply ambiguous and confusing ways. A full diachronic Chosȏ n chunghwajuȗ i went much farther than the older "Little China" doctrine or so chunghwajuȗi 小中華主義 by rejecting the epithet "little" and claiming that Chosȏn was the "real" chunghwa. "Little" suggests a lingering anxiety over Chosȏn's peripheral status-not only in a geographical but also political sense-vis-à-vis a great empire. Compare Weiguo Sun, "An Analysis of the 'Little China' Ideology of Chosȏn Korea," Frontiers of History in China 7, no. 2 (2012): 223-26.
36. Ledyard, "Hong Taeyong and His Peking Memoir," 89. Ledyard notes that the "essential thrust" of the Northern Studies movement, as stated in Pak Chega's Pukhak ȗi (A Proposal for Northern Studies), "was that China's material prosperity resulted from its well-developed technology and commerce, and that reforms promoting parallel development in Korea would bring greater prosperity and strength to the nation." Pukhak thinkers also praised "China's greater level of social equality and opportunity, arguing that the much more rigid barriers of Korea's class system inhibited many men of talent from making useful contributions to the nation" (88-89). history of the general usage of these terms in the Chosȏ n period has yet to be written. If yi, as we have seen,was a term that was traditionally applied to the eastern non-Han peoples, chȏ k was a broad term for the northern non-Han peoples. The term ho 胡 was historically an ethnic name for the Xiongnu 匈奴 in the Han period, and the term ro was used to refer to the northern Mongols in the Ming era, as in the term pungno 北虜. However, in combination these characters tended to lose their specific ethnic meaning. In Yȏ rha ilgi, Pak uses these terms often synonymously with "barbarians." Thus, he uses horo 胡虜 as a general term for the Mongol barbarians of the north and hojȏ k 胡狄 for the northern barbarians, including the Jurchens located to the north of Chosȏ n. The orangk'ae 兀良哈 or the Uriangkha were originally a Mongol tribe located northwest of Chosȏ n. In the Chosȏ n period, however, the term was also used to refer to Jurchen living to the north of the Korean peninsula. 38 Pak quotes a Chosȏ n official who used the term to refer to the Manchus. 39 As we shall see, Pak uses all these terms both to underscore the ethnic diversity of the Qing dynasty as well as to stress its distance from Confucian civility. This mingling of ethical and ethnic categories, however, causes conceptual difficulties for Pak who also denies that ethnicity must determine ethics in an absolute way. His own intellectual and moral identity depended, after all, on the disjunction between the two.
Drinking with Barbarians and Other Adventures
Pak Chiwȏ n arrived in Chengde on the ninth day of the eighth lunar month and left with the rest of the embassy on the fifteenth, two days after Qianlong's birthday. During the six days he was in Chengde, he met different kinds of nonHan people. Besides the Tibetans he meets in Tashilhunpo, Pak mentions Mongols, Uyghur Muslims, Russians, and Torghuts. However, he speaks most frequently of the Mongols throughout Yo˘rha ilgi. Pak's first significant description of Mongols occurs during his account of the events of the tenth day of the seventh lunar month, a full month before he reaches Chengde. Approaching Shenyang, Pak came upon the grand spectacle of "several thousands of carts belonging to the Mongols" entering the city. According to his vivid description, each cart was loaded with bricks and pulled along by three cows, mostly white, some blue, many of them bleeding at the nose because of the heavy weight of the carts and the high temperature. He continues:
The Mongols have high noses and deep eyes. Their wild and violent appearance makes them look inhuman. Their clothes and hats are tattered; their faces full of dust and dirt. However, their feet are always clad in socks. They look oddly at our servants who walk barefeet in their straw shoes. 40 Although this reads like a detailed eyewitness description of the Mongolians' physical appearance, there are numerous indications that Pak's primary goal here is to mark the Mongol's ethnic difference from the Chosȏ n people in a formal and symbolic fashion. The description of the Mongols' "high noses and deep eyes" is perfectly conventional and goes back to the Tang era, when the phrase shenmu gaobi 深目高鼻 became shorthand for non-Han-and by extension, barbarian-physiognomy. 41 Whereas the phrase "deep eyes and high noses" was originally used to describe primarily the inhabitants of Iranian Inner Asia, in Pak's altered ordering (鼻高目深) it functions mostly as shorthand for ethnic difference tout court. The reference to the Mongols' "inhuman" appearance is likewise less a literal description than a symbolic means of marking their barbarian culture. Pak makes it look as if he is responding obediently to the common pressure to equate foreigners with bestiality. At the same time, he makes discursive space for the Mongols' perspective on the Chosȏ n people-a perspective that has the subversive potential to reverse the tenor of Pak's description-when he describes their quizzical gaze at the Chosȏ n servants' lack of socks.
Pak continues this subtle balancing act in his portrayal of the horse grooms' antics.
Our grooms see the Mongols every year and know their dispositions well. For this reason, they play childish tricks on them. Using their whips, they knock off the Mongols' hats, then throw them by the roadside or treat them like balls, kicking them with their feet. The Mongols do not show anger. Smiling, both hands extended, they ask for their hats back in a peaceable manner. Sometimes a groom will snatch a Mongol's hat from behind, then run away into the fields, luring the Mongol to follow. Then he suddenly turns around and grabs the Mongol's waist, tripping him with his foot. There is no Mongol who manages to stand upright when thus tricked. The barbarians (ho 胡; emphasis mine) stop their carts and laugh together at the sight of the Chosȏ n groom sitting astride the fallen man's chest and pouring dirt into his mouth. The tripped Mongol also laughs as he gets up. He wipes his mouth and puts his hat back on, but does not try to start a fight. The groom Dȗ ngnyong 得龍, a native of Kasan 嘉山, is a horse groom. He has been traveling to Beijing for about forty years and speaks Chinese (Hanyu 漢語) very well. He called out to me from the middle of the crowd. When I came up to him after making my way through the throngs of people, Dȗ ngnyong was clasping the hands of an old Mongol prince and chattering away with him. The prince was wearing a hat crowned with a red jewel and a peacock feather. He was eighty-one years old; his back was bent and his height still reached one kil 丈. His face was a foot long and his skin was a black color that had faded into ashen white. While he talked, he shook his body and waved his head in an unseemly manner, like a rotten tree trunk about to fall. As he talked, all his vital energy poured out of his mouth. A man in advanced old age, he still looked as if he was in awe of no one, not even the Xiongnu Emperor Modu Chanyu. There were scores of attendants about but he needed nobody to prop him up. There was another Mongol prince who looked big and strong, and I went up to him with Dȗ ngnyong and tried to engage him in conversation. The Mongol pointed to my horsehair hat and asked me a question, but then suddenly disappeared in his palanquin before I could make out what his 
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This passage is striking because it underscores the communication gap that Pak faced as he attempted to befriend the Mongols. We see here a dramatic contrast between Dȗ ngnyong the lowly groom who, apparently by virtue of his fluent Mandarin, is able to converse with Mongol princes, and the tongue-tied Pak whose conversation partner disappears without waiting for an answer because Pak cannot decipher the question put to him. Pak's account of the aged Mongol king wavers between horror at the man's appearance and admiration for his lingering vitality. His account also begs all kinds of questions that go unanswered: why would a Mongol king greet a lowly Chosȏ n horsegroom so enthusiastically? It is not clear from the passage just what Pak's attitude toward the aged prince is, and the reference to Modu Chanyu suggests that, even as Pak consciously notes the difference between the Mongol and the Xiongnu, he is curiously linking the two. Pak was clearly curious enough to approach these Mongols but incapable of entering into meaningful conversation with them. All that he understood from his exchange with the younger Mongol prince, after all, was that the Mongol was interested in his hat. What the reader senses from this passage, above all, is Pak's bewilderment and perhaps also humiliation.The Mongols seem to be both overly civil and yet lacking in civility; too friendly and yet not friendly enough; physically alluring but also repellent. Pak's indecision here clearly has something to do with his inability to communicate with the people he is observing.
A yet more comical episode with Mongols occurs the following day (the eleventh day of the eighth month), when Pak decides to explore the streets outside the Bishu shanzhuang. Pak describes streets filled with black dust and the commotion created by carts and horses. He witnessed a street fight between a monk and a man on a donkey, walked into a fruit store, then noticed a tavern full of silver pots and pewter wine bottles. Enticed by the noisy buzz emanating from the second floor of the tavern, Pak decided to join the crowd. Pak evidently counted the twelve stairs that led him up to the buzz that sounded to him like a swarm of bees or mosquitoes. Was he deliberately taking his time as he walked into his adventure? Upstairs, he was startled to find that there were only Mongols and Muslims (Hui 回) sitting around drinking. We can sense surprise and discomposure in his declaration that, whether Han or Manchu, there is not a single Chinese (Middle Kingdom) person in sight (無論滿漢無一中國人). What is most striking about the ensuing scene is Pak's acute self-consciousness of himself as the lone non-Han, non-Manchu, non-Mongol, and non-Muslim presence there. Pak is able to distinguish between the Mongols and the Muslims by their hats, which he finds comical. But he is also aware that the Mongols and Muslims may find his hat equally comical and wonders out loud how he appears in the eyes of these two ro 兩虜 groups. 44 For Pak, of course, this was not just a matter of intellectual curiosity. His safety was at stake. The way Pak tells the rest of the story, he regretted his visit to the tavern as soon as he saw that he had walked into a tiger's den, as it were. But he could not afford to let his fear show. So he took the bold step of deliberately drawing everybody's attention to himself, to make sure nobody would mistake him for a coward. He shouted for his wine, told the attendant he wanted his drink cold, then gulped the entire serving down in one gulp. He was knowingly going against the Chinese way of drinking heated wine in small sips from tiny wine cups, never ever leaving cups upside down or shaking out the remaining drops after sipping. He acted, in short, like a barbarian. Just as Pak was about to pay and leave, a group of northern barbarians (kunho 群胡) approached him. Pak writes that fear made his back grow damp with sweat. The barbarians invited him to their table and served him three cups of wine. Pak dumped the three cups into a tea bowl after removing the tea leaves, then downed the liquor in the bowl, after which he made a show of bowing to the barbarians and then left. Pak states that his hair was standing on end as he left, so afraid was he of being followed. When he was at a safe distance, he turned back to check no one was following. Loud shouts of laughter emanated from the tavern. Pak tersely comments: "They must have been talking about me."
From the context, it is quite clear that the barbarians who accost him in the tavern are Mongols since it was standard to use the term ho for them. Pak's inclusion of the Muslims under the term horo is unusual but perhaps understandable given his lack of knowledge about the Muslims. His preference for the general rather than the more specific ethnic term and the lack of details (aside from the hats) about the Mongols and the Muslims suggest that the main point of this episode is Pak's self-conscious awareness of himself as a barbarian among other barbarians. Pak leads the reader to view himself from the perspective of the barbarians and even to laugh behind his back. Pak understands all too well that barbarianism is a relative thing; it is created by the clash of different customs and mores. He also understands that to look at another as a barbarian implies that his othering gaze will inevitably be returned to him.
There are several glitches in this satisfyingly symmetrical story, however. How did Pak, who relied on brush talk to communicate with others and who had very limited command of spoken Chinese or Manchu, order his wine? How did he manage to tell the attendant to bring a larger bowl and not to bother with heating up the wine? Pak claims, after all, to have shouted out (kyu 叫) his requests. And how did he know so much about the Mongol drinking culture, which he describes as being not so different from that of China (Middle Kingdom)? How much of this scene consists of real bravura? In this scene, which plays so much on the notion of the barbarian, the notion of ethnic difference is surprisingly vague: the Han and Manchu are lumped together under the category of China (Middle Kingdom); the Mongols and Muslims are equally ro (兩虜).
In the diary sections of Yȏ rha ilgi, where Pak very deliberately focuses on events he has witnessed, there is a great deal of this kind of painful, self-reflexive self-consciousness. One reason why Pak is so sensitive to his own status as a stranger, I suggest, is because he is excluded from the scenes he is witnessing by virtue of his inability to speak the language of the people he is interacting with. In his preface to the chapter entitled "Questions and Answers about Lamaism," Pak notes that there are several "impossibilities" (pulga 不可) one faces as a traveler in a foreign land (t'abang 他邦), all of which have something to do with the challenge of linguistic difference. As a foreigner in a foreign land, Pak declares, it is impossible to approach people freely on a road to ask a question, or say all that one wishes to express, or be entirely free from the suspicion of being a spy. A foreigner always misses the mark by using language that either is too shallow or probes too deep, and asks questions that are inappropriate. A foreigner is always making a faux pas because he does not know all the rules. 45 In Chengde, where so many different ethnic peoples had congregated, the task of figuring out what was going on, let alone making oneself understood, was not at all a simple task.
The most striking example of the linguistic challenges involved in Chengde appears in Pak's account of the meeting with the Panchen Lama. When Pak and the Chosȏ n emissaries visited Tashilhunpo, there were two Mongol princes waiting on the Panchen Lama (apparently not the two whom he met outside the Bishu shanzhuang). After the Mongols and the Chosȏ n visitors presented the khata to the Panchen Lama, they drank tea and attempted a conversation. Pak notes that when the Panchen Lama spoke to the Chosȏ n visitors, they had to wait for several interpreters to translate for them. The Panchen Lama first spoke to the lamas in attendance, who translated his Tibetan words into the Mongol language for the Mongol princes, who translated his words into Manchu for the Qing translator, who then translated the Lama's words into Korean for the Chosȏ n translator, who finally communicated to the Chosȏ n emissaries what the Panchen Lama had said. 46 This passage shows us the multiple linguistic challenges that Pak faced in writing about Chengde. He was aware that he lacked the proper linguistic skills to understand what was happening in Chengde. He was in many ways out of place and out of his depth there. How, then, does he claim authority for himself?
One key strategy that Pak uses is to dwell at length on the brush talk conversations he had with various people he met at the Confucian Temple of Culture where he stayed during his time in Chengde.
47 Through these learned conversations, which make up a very large part of Yȏ rha ilgi, he attempts to make up for his failure as an eyewitness observer and as a cultural translator. Another strategy Pak uses is to rely on previously established ethnological discourse that compensates for his linguistic and cultural remove from the Chengde scene. This discourse, which does not depend on an observing "I," or which places the observing "I" at a very distant remove from the scenes he is witnessing and generates a macroscopic bird's eye view, allows Pak to speak authoritatively about phenomena that he has not been able to decipher in any detail. It also enables Pak to proffer a political analysis of Chengde that, in turn, clarifies the specific challenges and limits of Qing imperial rule. It is to this aspect of Yȏ rha ilgi that I will now turn. 
The Emperor's Troubles
The concluding passage of the chapter on "Questions and Answers about Lamaism" begins with a recap of the episode of the two Mongol kings. Pak writes:
At the residence of the so-called living Buddha in Tashilhunpo I met two Mongol kings, and I saw two more under the gate of the Bishu shanzhuang. The older king was eighty-one years old. His waist was as bent as a bell and his skin and bones black with age. His face was as long as a donkey's, though, and his height reached one kil 丈. The younger king looked like a ghost straight out of a painting (chonggyudo 鍾馗圖) or a deity of misfortune (koegang 魁罡).
The Tibetans (Sȏ ban, Ch. Xifan 西番) were even uglier. As a group they looked wild and unsightly, like bizarre animals or strange spirits.They instilled fear in my heart. The Muslims (Hoeja, Ch. Huizi 回子) are descendants of the ancient Uyghurs (Hoehȗ l, Ch. Huigu 回鶻) and seemed yet wilder and more savage. The Tusi 土司 were not very different from the Tibetans or Uyghurs in their physical vigor.
The Russians (Angnasa, Ch. Eluosi 鄂羅斯) are a tribe that reside along the banks of the Amur River (Heilongjiang 黑龍江). When they are at home they are always hugging a dog as large as a donkey. They hang ten bells around the dog's neck and decorate it with various strings. The dogs pull carts. When the dogs are so big, how much bigger then must be their owners? When the Russians walk about they always have a dog with them. They look askance and play flutes. They wear hats and clothes that clearly mark their status and so are easily distinguished one from another.
They say that the number of Manchus has greatly increased but they cannot be half as many as "all under heaven"(ch'ȏ nha 天下). It is now already over one hundred years since they entered the Central Plain (chungwȏ n, Ch. zhongyuan 中原) and started living on Chinese land. Having lived for so many years in the midst of Chinese customs and manners, they are now no different from the Han Chinese (mu'i Han'in 無異漢人). They are just as elegant and refined; they have voluntarily become lettered and effeminate. 48 When we compare the description of the Mongol princes with the earlier passage, we immediately note that the younger Mongol prince whom Pak approached together with the horse groom Dȗ ngnyong has turned into a ghost, a deity, a painting. He is no longer an individual and only a type of the frightening barbarian "other." Pak has clearly added on the learned references to paintings and to mythology to enhance his authority as an interpreter, as well as to square his experience with existing lore about ethnic others on the borders of 48. "Hwanggyo mundap" 黃敎問答, Yȏnamjip 13.30b.
China. He has also quietly omitted his own role in this encounter with the Mongols, precisely to make them more foreign and strange. Pak's ensuing description of the animal-like, ghost-like, savage and wild appearance of the Tibetans and Muslims (who are not described in any physical detail) makes it clear that Pak's primary purpose in naming these different ethnic categories is less to differentiate between them in a meaningful sense than to point to the multi-ethnic nature of the Qing empire. By the time we arrive at the Russians, whom Pak never actually met in Chengde, his self-conscious and self-reflexive "I" has disappeared altogether from the scene, and we are left with a clearly derivative and generic account of these Heilongjiang strangers.
After this catalogue of various ethnic peoples, Pak launches into an analysis of the geopolitical significance of Chengde. Using striking imagery, Pak states that in Chengde, the Qing emperor sits pressing down on the "brain" of "all under heaven" and holds the Mongols by their throat. 49 If the emperor fails to defend Chengde, the Mongols will erupt and shake up the Liaodong area, and the Qing will lose its left arm. Should this happen, it will not take long for the Tibetans to start rising up as well. 50 Pak thus argues that Chengde is the strategic center of political intelligence in the Qing imperium. Pak's anatomical analogy emphasizes the political intelligence of the Qing emperor who sits in command there, but it is also awkward: how does one sit on top of a brain? The analogy ends with the disturbing image of a political body that is continually threatened with dismemberment and violent disintegration. Pak's central question here has to do with the stability of the Qing empire. Can the center hold? Confronted with the grand but also chaotic spectacle of the multi-ethnic groups that had gathered in Chengde, Pak clearly was forced to revise the sinocentric model of "all under heaven." What he saw in Chengde, even from his very limited perspective, was clearly not "the Confucian ideal of transforming (and culturally unifying) all peoples under a Confucian ruler." passed, there should appear a man who has the foresight to worry about what will happen in "all under heaven," he will surely think of my words today. This is why I have recorded the miscellaneous kinds of northern barbarians that I have seen (hojȏ k chapchong 胡狄雜種).
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The Qing imperium, in Pak's eyes, is a fragile one. It is a center that cannot hold, because in the end the Manchus are only one of the many "miscellaneous kinds of northern barbarians" who have always been in strife against one another, and whose diversity will always be a source of political instability. For the barbarian is by definition doomed to the border zone, locked in a perpetual struggle against not only "all under heaven" but also other barbarians who compete in the space of the frontier. Although Pak voices his "thankfulness" that his country lies at a great distance from the troubles of the Qing empire, this passage shows that he feared that the Qing imperium would not hold and that Chosȏ n would be swept up in the chaos that would ensue when it collapsed. Pak's prophetic, indeed almost apocalyptic, tone here is anticipated in an earlier passage where he emphasizes the "troubles" (ko 苦) of the Qing empire. Why should the mighty emperor spend so much time in the isolated and remote area of Chengde if he were not so "troubled" about defending his empire? From this, Pak states, we can infer that the Mongols are strong enough to pain and "trouble" him. Why should the powerful Qianlong be so "troubled" as to invite the Panchen Lama all the way to Chengde and shower him with all kinds of luxuries? Qianlong is apparently honoring his religious teacher, Pak comments, but in fact he is imprisoning the Tibetan leader in a golden pavilion and praying each day that the Tibetans will not cause trouble. From this, he concludes, we can infer that the Tibetans are even stronger than the Mongols. and even ate the paper on which their brush talk was recorded. Pak concluded that, under the semblance of universal peace, there lay a smoldering cauldron of unresolved antipathies and hostilities. As a conquered people, the Han Chinese had no choice but to praise and support Qing rule, but were necessarily "troubled" by their subjugated state. The Manchus, who were well aware of this state of affairs, were no less "troubled" about the political and cultural fissures that existed under the semblance of peace.
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Pak intuited a connection between the hushed and secretive brush talk of the Han Chinese and Manchus and the grand imperial spectacles going on in Chengde. Behind Qianlong's imperial splendor lay "troubles" gnawing away at the emperor's heart. The grand gestures of gift-taking and gift-giving were calculated moves designed to appease peoples who might any day turn into dangerous foes. The glorious spectacles honoring Qianlong's lifelong political success were meant to silence skeptics and outlaw dissent. Scholars censored themselves and covered their tracks. Pak could not believe that the semblance of peace would last.
Conclusion
The new historians of Qing history have proposed that the Qing empire promoted a "vision of a universal rulership based on the submission of divergent peoples, whose cultures would remain separate." 55 In this sense, the Qing rulers accepted and acknowledged ethnic and cultural difference, even as they sought to strengthen the ethnic identity of the Manchus. This ethnic identity, according to the new historical scholarship that is often dubbed the "new Qing history," did not exist prior to the Qing state but was created by it. As William T. Rowe puts it, "The group that succeeded the Ming on the Dragon Throne was not a Manchu race but was instead an organization of persons deliberately created for the purpose of conquest." 56 Not only were the Manchus an effective political invention rather than a racial category, they were never sinicized in the way that previous scholarship suggested. As Rowe puts it, Our previous understanding was that the Manchus, like all other aspiring barbarian conquerors of China, adopted Chinese ways of governance and 54. Ibid., 13.18a. legitimation of their rule, becoming in effect civilized Chinese. We know now that nothing so complete ever happened. The Qing rulers wore many hats and governed their diverse constituencies (Jurchen, Mongol, Tibetan, Chinese) in different ways simultaneously. If the Qing ruler was the Son of Heaven for his Chinese subjects, he was also the Khan of Khans for the Mongols, the Cakravartin (Wheel-Turning King) for the Tibetans, and so on. The Qing would be a diverse, multinational, and presumably universal empire, very different from the Chinese dynasties it succeeded. 57 Like so many other sinocentric scholars both ancient and modern, Pak remains in many ways strongly attached to a Han historiography and adheres to the "assimilation" model whereby the acculturated Manchus have become "no different from the Han Chinese" (mu'i Han'in 無異漢人). His experience in Chengde, however, taught him that the Qing empire was far from a sinocentric one. Even as Pak acknowledges the Manchus as the rulers of the Qing empire, he remains skeptical of the idea of a multi-national, multi-ethnic, and multicultural empire and views the intermixing of Confucianism with Tibetan Buddhism with evident horror and incomprehension. Tibetan Buddhism is indeed so far from his intellectual universe that he can only interpret Qianlong's relationship with the Panchen Lama in terms of political expediency and secret "troubles." Chengde, land of the horo 胡虜, remains an unstable frontier where barbarians jostle for power and recognition.
As I have tried to argue, however, the sinocentric narrative in Pak's Yȏ rha ilgi is destabilized by several factors, first and foremost of which is his own awareness of the limitations of the hwa-yi 華-夷 opposition. The Chosȏ n Chunghwa 中華 doctrine translated the concept of hwa 華 as a cultural rather than geographical or ethnic term, downplaying the centrality of geography or biological descent in cultural identity. Pak follows this doctrine in identifying the "Middle Kingdom" or "all under heaven" with Confucian cultural hegemony. When Pak deploys ethnic categories, as with the Tibetan, Mongol, and Uyghur peoples, he plays on physical and biological differences. However, this language is less in service of what we might today recognize as racial ideology than a traditional cultural centrism. His point is that these people harbor such differences that they cannot be organically united into an anatomical whole. At the same time, Pak is aware that ethnic differences are not always legible and that categories that look ethnic may not be based on descent. He often finds that ethnological schemata do not work. People he took to be Manchus sometimes turn out to be Mongols and Mongols sometimes turn out to be learned in the 57. Ibid., 17.
Chinese classics. From the case of Qifeng'e, the Manchu bannerman of Chosȏ n descent, Pak learns that descent and ethnic status may not coincide. On several occasions, Pak comments with distaste on Chosȏ n prejudice against Manchus. He writes:
The titled officials from our country puff themselves up and place themselves so high. When they see a person from the Great Kingdom they care not whether it is a Han Chinese or a Manchu. It is all the same to them; they are all northern barbarians (horo 胡虜).
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Pak's appalled description of the "small" behavior of his fellow countrymen shows us how self-serving the category of horo is. This passage suggests that the indiscriminate category of "northern barbarians" is blind to ethnic and cultural difference; as a label it obviates analysis; it derives from a need to exclude and privilege oneself at the expense of others. And yet, as we have seen, Pak himself was not above resorting to such categories in his need to define and defend a central and centralizing culture to which he paid allegiance. Despite his awareness of its fallacies, Pak inherited and worked with a "basic dichotomy between civilization and barbarity" inherited from the Ming dynasty. The Qing world posed a challenge to him precisely because it "tended to eschew this binarism and to view the empire as composed of potentially infinite variety, all united and resolved at the point of the emperorship itself." 59 Pak was not adequately equipped to read this difference and variety at the heart of the Qing empire. The reason why Yȏ rha ilgi remains a compelling read for contemporary readers, however, is because Pak puts his finger on what was genuinely strange and new in his discovery of Chengde, "an empire in miniature" and a city where he, too, briefly became a barbarian. 60 
